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3. Narratives of Fundamentalism, 
Negative Capability and the 
Democratic Imperative
Alan Bainbridge and Linden West
Alan Bainbridge and Linden West offer a theoretical discussion of 
(mainly) contemporary British society with particular reference to 
Stoke-on-Trent, the home of the Workers’ Education Association and a 
city still struggling to adjust following the decline of the pottery industry. 
They posit the growth of fundamentalism as a search for certainties and 
propose that Keats’ notion of negative capability (the ability to accept 
uncertainty) may offer an alternative lens.
The Starting Point: Fundamentalism Is Ordinary
T he notion that ‘we’, as individuals, whole groups or cultures, possess the truth and nothing but the truth, unlike the other and otherness, 
seems to be a universal discursive tendency, colonizing diverse minds 
and hearts, across different historical times and geographical spaces. 
The truth and nothing but the truth of politics, religion, economics, 
and of myth and diverse ideologies  —  here lies the province of the 
fundamentalist; and maybe the fundamentalist lurking in every one 
of our psychologies and cultures. Fundamentalism, we argue, is quite 
ordinary. 
The word fundamentalism was coined in California and its origins 
lie in Protestant movements in nineteenth-century America. These 
movements consisted of people who wanted to assert the inerrancy of the 
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Bible — the direct creation of the world and humanity ex nihilo by God 
as opposed to Darwinian evolution — and the authenticity of miracles 
and the Virgin birth. But fundamentalism and related discourses of 
absolute truth encompass very different phenomena (Ruthven, 2007). 
Following Wittgenstein, the word, heuristically, is helpful in a search 
for discursive similarities across different forms. Of course, not every 
person whom we call a fundamentalist reaches for a Kalashnikov or 
pipe bomb. But, broadly speaking, fundamentalism can be thought 
of as a retreat from engagement with others and otherness, rooted, 
perhaps, in feelings of disrespect, marginalization and or psychological 
or even cultural vulnerability. It works at the level of discourse or 
metanarrative, colonizing inner space: the other — whether Jew, ‘White 
trash’, ‘people of colour’, Muslims, working class people, etc.  —  is to 
blame for a range of ills. Fundamentalism also presents itself as beyond 
contestation, that there is simply no alternative available, as in the kind 
of market fundamentalism pervading the contemporary world. In 
the case of racism and Islamism, people turn to those who think like 
themselves and hostility develops towards the different other, or ideas 
and experiences that challenge their view of the world. Fundamentalism 
among some men, for instance, can represent a reaction to the terror of 
seeming feminine and unmanly — as in extreme fascistic organizations 
(Flemmen, 2014).
The dynamics of fundamentalism can encompass processes we might 
recognize in ourselves, at least at times: when stress and uncertainty 
seem overwhelming, when we feel out of our depth and can’t cope, 
and when we may grab at facts or certainties to help manage anxiety. 
Traits such as dogmatism, rigidity and a need for order and power, can 
underpin a wide psycho-political spectrum of people and groups. The 
need for external sources of absolute authority or truth, or for discourses 
of complete certainty — for the mythical texts of Communism, Islamism 
or Catholicism  —  may be a kind of defence against not knowing, as 
well as being a widespread human phenomenon. So is the tendency, 
individually and collectively, to split off parts of ourselves that we fear 
or don’t like, such as the capacity for violence or greed, and to project 
these onto others.
We can factor ‘market fundamentalism’ into our wordplay, with its 
dogmatism, its tendency towards absolute truths and its disparagement 
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of the poor as deviant and wholly responsible for their own condition. 
According to academic and psychoanalyst Paul Verhaeghe (2014), 
this way of thinking casts the unsuccessful as deficient in some way, 
embedding and exacerbating feelings of confusion and despair 
engendered by disadvantage. Turning inwards, people feel increasingly 
isolated and this insularity extends into institutional life. When 
educational and care establishments function as businesses and 
financial reward depends on performance, team spirit and cooperative 
endeavour are replaced by competition and personal enterprise. This 
individualism penetrates wider society making it harder to develop 
and sustain deep, even loving, relationships and, thus, our lives are 
colonized by the performative imperative. 
Verhaeghe’s main concern is how social change has led to what he 
calls a psychic crisis and altered the way we think about ourselves. 
He has investigated the effects of neoliberal fundamentalism for more 
than thirty years, concluding that the context in which we live heavily 
influences who we become, and that neoliberal practices have negative 
consequences on mental health, for example, the development of 
narcissistic tendencies. 
He claims that ‘dependence is spineless’ and believes that we 
must make our mark, stand up for ourselves and do our own thing 
(Verhaeghe, 2014, p. 13). Such individualism and the disintegration of 
collective notions of well-being can exact a terrible price in suffering 
and distress. So too might the tendency to blame the poor for their 
condition and the negative stereotyping of whole communities. Some 
turn in response to the racist gang or extreme Islamist group: having a 
gang and mythic narrative of our own is one response to anomie and 
alienation (West, 2016).
We suggest that an important antidote to fundamentalist 
tendencies, of whatever kind, lies in what the English poet John 
Keats called ‘negative capability’. This is the capacity to live in doubt 
and not knowing, as part of a process of coming to know and being 
open to what may be more truthful, worthwhile, even beautiful. Such 
capability, we argue, is grounded in the quality of our relationships, 
which encompass educational settings as well as families, communities 
and those closest to us. We explore one manifestation of negative 
capability in a form of liberal workers’ education that emerged in 
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the United Kingdom at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. But we also suggest, paradoxically, that we might have 
need of our fundamentalisms, at times, in biographical trajectories, 
as a means to escape restrictive and stifling cultures of conformity. 
Adolescent flirtations with various forms of extreme politics is one 
example. However, we regard this as part of the difficult business of 
growing up, and as a stage in the struggle for more open, reflexive and 
dialogical ways of knowing.
Distress in a City
Our central argument is the outcome of historical reappraisal and in-depth, auto/biographical narrative research into racism 
and fundamentalism in a post-industrial city, Stoke-on-Trent, in the 
English Midlands, where Linden was born and raised (West, 2016). 
The research included in-depth narrative interviews with autodidacts, 
schooled in workers’ education and the wider Labour movement. 
He revisited the history of workers’ education, including his own 
writing (West, 1972), in the light of the city’s post-industrial distress, 
encompassing racism on the public housing estate where he had 
lived. The process was stimulated by Jonathan Rose’s reassessment 
of workers’ education (Rose, 2010) and its place in the development 
of British social democracy, alongside the insights of the historian 
Lawrence Goldman (1995; 2013). Rose drew on diverse personal 
testimonies and forms of life writing in his re-evaluation of the Workers’ 
Educational Association (WEA) while Goldman interrogated the 
historical interpretation of historians like Roger Fieldhouse and Stuart 
Macintyre. Linden was once modishly dismissive of forms of workers’ 
education. But then he was a child of the 1960s, when space opened for 
critical thinking alongside new forms of fundamentalism, hubris and 
dismissiveness towards previous generations. This is a central theme 
of his recent book (West, 2016).
The basic contention of the chapter is that we are all prone, at times, 
to cling to what we conceive to be the truth and nothing but that truth, 
which can be illuminated through auto/biographical and historical 
enquiry. In the history of workers’ education, for instance, in the United 
Kingdom, non-conformist autodidacts could sometimes be dogmatic, 
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rooted in religion or hard, structuralist readings of Marxism. Their 
questioning was paradoxical: challenging conventional wisdoms but 
inflexible in their response to others. They might quote texts with quasi-
religious fervour in workers’ classes. Their Marxism could involve an 
extremely mechanical version of the materialist conception of history, in 
which human activity was controlled by economic forces independent 
of human volition (Macintyre, 1980). 
Workers’ education in the UK was characterized by a mix of 
Enlightenment idealism, the aspirations of democratic socialism, as well 
as Marxism, and for many, a religious belief in the potential divinity 
in everyone. It was a social as much as an educational movement. 
Jonathan Rose (2010) argues that it played a key role in creating the 
welfare state after the Second World War. Workers’ education could 
model, in microcosm, the good, fraternal and equal dialogical and 
democratic society. These adult classes represented a social and 
educational experiment open to the marginalized, with an equality of 
status between students that encouraged freedom of expression and 
enquiry, tolerance and respect, alongside the turbulence generated in 
the clash of ideas and difference. But difference and dispute did not, in 
general, degenerate into ‘I-it’ objectification, at least in any permanent 
way. At their best the classes were communities of imaginative, caring, 
committed and thoughtful students, in which all could be teachers as 
well as learners. 
Workers’ education, in the form of tutorial classes, once thrived in 
Stoke. The first ever university workers’ tutorial class took place there in 
1908 sponsored by the University of Oxford. Thirty or so worker-students 
met on Friday evenings for two hours, over a period of years, with their 
tutor, R. H. Tawney, subsequently a distinguished economic historian. 
The tutorial classes constituted an alliance, unusual in European 
popular education, between progressive elements in universities and 
workers’ organizations. The classes were free from prescribed curricula 
and members were encouraged to explore issues in their working lives 
from the perspectives of history, politics, economics and literature. 
Fortnightly essays were required, and the standard of some of these 
was high (Goldman, 1995; West, 1972, 2017). There were no formal 
examinations or qualifications due to a desire to eliminate competition 
and vocationalism from the classroom (Rose, 2010; West, 1972). 
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The first students met in the pottery town of Longton that was to 
become part of the new city of Stoke-on-Trent. They were potters, miners, 
clerks, shop assistants and elementary school teachers, women as well 
as men (West, 1972). Many came from nonconformist backgrounds, 
from families that encouraged them to think for themselves. The 
Marxist Social Democratic Federation (SDF) made up the nucleus of the 
first class. The Social Democratic Federation was formed in 1883 under 
the leadership of Henry Hyndman, who was the son of a businessman 
and became a journalist and political agitator (Macintyre, 1980). The 
Federation was strongly opposed to the British Liberal Party of the 
time, and its programme was progressive, calling for a forty-eight-hour 
working week, the abolition of child labour, compulsory free secular 
education, equality for women and the nationalization of the means 
of production, distribution and exchange. Some members of the SDF, 
according to Stuart Macintyre, held an extremely ‘mechanical version 
of the materialist conception of history’ in which the whole of human 
experience was controlled by economic forces independent of human 
agency (Macintyre, 1980, p. 17). Education, politics and consciousness 
were mere epiphenomena of the techniques and relations of production. 
Such students could be rigid in their economic doctrines (ibid.), and 
this rigidity played out in the tutorial classes. 
However, Tawney (1917) thought the tutorial class ‘movement’ and 
the WEA a successful ‘experiment in democratic education’ (Taylor 
& Steele, 2011, pp. 32, 30). According to him, it was founded on three 
core principles. First, the opposition to revolutionary violence: ‘one 
may not do evil that good should come’, in Cobbett’s dictum of a 
century before. Second, no institution, however perfect in conception, 
could be made to work effectively by individuals whose morality was 
inadequate. Third, where a sound morality was lacking, this could 
be forged in a community of scholars seeking truth and the common 
good (Dennis & Halsey, 1988). There was an Aristotelian ideal at 
work, as well as Oxford idealism (Goldman, 1995): notions of the fully 
developed person living in communities, building and sustaining 
virtue in relationship  —  communities cultivating not self- but other-
regardedness  —  directing themselves to higher aims than the purely 
egotistic or narcissistic (Dennis & Halsey, 1988). The idealists at Oxford 
who influenced Tawney were opposed to individualism, utilitarianism 
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and social atomism and drew on German philosophers, especially Kant 
and Hegel, and the notion that individuals are best understood and can 
best realize their potential in the collective. Men and women were part 
of webs of social and political, as well as economic relationships from 
which they could not be divorced for analytic or practical purposes. 
They were linked together by values, institutions and diverse patterns 
of association rather than economics alone. 
Tawney himself had doubts about the tutorial classes, not least the 
intellectual and emotional effort required from the worker students. 
Tawney was also far from a naïve idealist and there were ‘limits to his 
moralising’, as Lawrence Goldman notes (Goldman, 1995, p. 160). He 
was aware that the same spirit of non-conformity that drove some of the 
worker students could also narrow viewpoints and bring the tendency 
to over-proselytize, making it difficult to engage in dialogue and be 
respectful to difference. 
Breakdown, and Taking Tea
I t is interesting that many of the worker-students admired tutors like Tawney, who remained steadfast as well as respectful even 
when harangued by a fundamentalist student. Leftist fundamentalists, 
sometimes from the Social Democratic Federation and later the 
Communist Party, though not exclusively so, might quote from texts 
like Das Capital with religious fervour. The other students noted how 
Tawney remained steadfast in the face of provocation. One recalled 
a particular Marxist  —  the SDF could dominate the early tutorial 
classes — challenging point after point and referring to classic Marxist 
texts. Tawney took it in his stride but insisted that there were other 
points of view. The student accused the tutor of hopping around like a 
bird, from twig to twig, and a sense of bad temper pervaded the room. 
However, Tawney insisted that everyone, including his challenger, take 
tea together afterwards and tell stories, read poetry and sing songs. A 
shared humanity and a spirit of fraternity were restored (Rose, 2010, 
p. 266; West, 2017). The class stayed together despite the local secretary 
of the SDF demanding that his members leave for fear of contamination 
(Goldman, 2013). 
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John Holford (2015) usefully reminds us that these were classes, 
not lectures, and ideas were explored and developed in discussion. 
The processes of education were democratized  —  students engaged 
in research and discovery through using original source material, like 
historical documents, rather than simply relying on secondary texts. 
The fundamental aim of the tutorial classes was to make university 
education available to all people in their localities, in pedagogically 
democratic and dialogical ways. The movement was about building 
social solidarities rather than the contemporary obsession with social 
mobility. Humanity, risk taking, and engagement with otherness, and 
challenges to fundamentalism, of whatever kind, constituted a cultural 
as well as collective challenge to the seductions of omniscience. 
The Seductions of Fundamentalism
W e are suggesting that a long, never-to-be-completed struggle is to be fought against fundamentalism, in ourselves as well as others. 
Psychoanalyst Adam Phillips (2012) has considered the relationship 
between the internal world and the appeal of fundamentalism. Drawing 
on clinical work, over many years, he discusses the problems of ‘not 
getting it’ in intimate or wider social life. Not ‘getting it’, feeling 
confused, misunderstood or inadequate can have devastating effects 
in early life. We don false mantles in the hope of gaining the other’s 
attention and regard. ‘Getting it’ — feeling understood by a powerful 
other — means potentially not feeling humiliated or diminished. ‘Not 
getting it’, however — not understanding what is going on and feeling 
lost and frantic, like the child who struggles to understand a mother’s 
depression — is a widespread human experience. What we may then 
long for, as mentioned above, is a gang and a mythic narrative of our 
own. A dream of like-mindedness is the dream in which the possibility 
of not getting it disappears. We can be attracted to groups of the like-
minded because the issue of not getting it is resolved in the abolition of 
complexity. The defence against not getting it, or not knowing, evokes 
the seduction of certainty. Hannah Arendt (1958) observed how opinion 
can solidify into ideology and fundamentalism, which demand assent 
and certainty. There are fundamentalisms of the left as well as of the 
political and ideological right. 
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The process involves creating rigid boundaries between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, and between our self of present understanding and a potential 
self of a different way of seeing. Fundamentalist groups offer compelling 
‘truths’ of how the other is to blame — whether in the ‘moral corruption’ 
of the West or the ‘greedy Jew’  —  and how ‘our’ group is good. The 
trouble is that this involves splitting into an idealized self or selves, and the 
projection onto the other of aspects we most dislike in ourselves. No hard 
work is required in this anti-education, because the fault lies elsewhere. 
The turn to fundamentalism, old and new, brings for its disciples the 
feeling of getting it, of belonging, of recognition in a grand if delusional 
way. We are made to feel part of something that is essential to creating 
a purified world. Education, however, as in the workers’ tutorial classes, 
gives us choice — to decide whether or not we love the world enough 
to wish to seek to understand and take responsibility for it, as well as to 
engage with the other in humane and open ways (Nixon, 2015). 
Therefore, we suggest there are psychosocial patterns across 
fundamentalism in its many guises. Wittgenstein thought it important 
to play with similarities in the use of a word: a word such as ‘games’, 
for instance, in its various guises. Ball games, word games, Olympic 
Games are all different but there can be family resemblances (Ruthven, 
2007). There may be resemblances between market and Islamic 
fundamentalism, or between the zealots in a tutorial class and (only 
occasionally we hope), our own behaviour. Islamic fundamentalism 
may, like forms of leftist ideology, exploit the power of trauma and myth 
in the processes of radicalization. If Islam is full of narratives of mercy 
and tolerance, as Christianity and socialism are, all too have a darker 
side (Hassan & Weiss, 2015). The dark side is revealed in the worship 
of violence, the degeneration of the ideals of the French Revolution 
into slaughter, and the grotesque narcissism of small difference that 
continues to haunt the progressive imagination.
Market fundamentalism might appear to be different with regards 
to violence. But it too employs powerful mythology, grounded in 
social Darwinism and the cult of success, in ways that have penetrated 
to the heart of modern Western societies. The market is sovereign and 
can provide for all human needs: consumption is crucial, as is the 
consumer (rather than the citizen). It works through appealing, via 
instruments of persuasion, to a desire for status, triumph, power, sexual 
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success and transcendental performance (Verhaeghe, 2014). It may 
also, in its manipulation of images, employ violence in video games 
or social media to sell products, using heroes, myths and triumphal 
sexual conquest to make its pitch. Thus Mirowski (2013), drawing on 
Hayek’s free market ideas, argues that neoliberalism is profoundly 
anti-educational in its assumptions and practices: encouraging the 
prioritization of the market and consumption as the only good. Too 
much education of a questioning kind is antithetical to the efficient 
functioning of markets and the cultivation of desire, discontent and 
materialistic illusions on which conspicuous consumption depends.
We suggest that the importance of the open, diverse social and 
educational group for human flourishing mirrors the psychoanalytic 
stress on the cosmopolitan, democratic psyche or Biesta’s normative 
subjectification (Biesta, 2011). Andrew Samuels (1993) has written that 
the cultural diversity of the population is not a disaster, but a challenge 
and opportunity for healthy internal life. How to remain open to others 
and acknowledge and learn from difference, rather than seeing it as a 
threat, becomes the central issue for us all. The metaphor of the psyche 
as a theatre helps us to comprehend this idea: internal worlds are 
constituted and peopled by varied ‘objects’ drawn from intersubjective 
relationships  —  objects that encourage or constrain and enable us to 
take risks with the unknown and the other. 
But, as indicated, there can be a more positive and developmental 
dimension to our relationship with fundamentalism. An insight into 
this emerged in a discussion on the social unconscious at the ESREA 
Triennial Conference in 2017 (Salling Olesen et al., 2017). Lynn Froggett, 
in response to Linden’s paper, described how she embraced the Socialist 
Workers Party, at one stage in her life, as a kind of antidote to the stifling 
narrowness of a provincial background. She used its discursive forms, 
however ‘fundamentalist’ these might have been, as a good object, in 
psychoanalytic terms, to break free from certain kinds of conformity 
and to play with new discourses. We might need a more sympathetic 
educational reading of fundamentalist tendencies, one that can be 
biographically developmental. The capacity for negative capability 
might, in such terms, be a lifelong struggle. 
 833. Narratives of Fundamentalism
Negative Capability and the Unconscious 
I t is worth returning to Keats’ emblematic consideration of the struggle to remain engaged with the verisimilitude of beauty. He refers to this in 
a letter (Keats, 1817/2018) to his brothers and offers a helpful metaphor, 
especially when combined with psychoanalytic understandings of 
the interplay between internal and external worlds. Keats introduces 
the principle of negative capability as his letter ends  —  it seemingly 
emerges from a discussion on the qualities required for ‘achievement’ in 
literature. Yet the narrative of the letter is initially less whimsical, indeed, 
rather prosaic, as tales are told of endless dining out while bemoaning 
such conviviality (‘for I have been out too much lately’). Keats is critical 
of a painting he had recently seen that offered ‘nothing to be intense on’, 
arguing that the excellence of art is in its intensity. ‘I imagine a painting, 
that in common-parlance, is what it is’; there being no depth of hidden 
meaning, no salacious seduction, for Keats, ‘no women one feels mad to 
kiss’. The painting disappoints on all levels as it has an ‘unpleasantness 
without momentous depth of speculation excited, in which to bury its 
repulsiveness’. There appears to be a disconnect between the realness 
of the painting and the emotion it could, should evoke, if it were good. 
Despite being an actual painting, existing in an actual world, there is for 
Keats something viscerally lacking in it, and it is this something that can 
make a painting ‘intense’.
There is a similar story told in the same letter, not of painting, or 
literature, but of how to enjoy the company of others. Keats acknowledges 
that he has dined out too much, and maybe has become weary of company. 
He complains to his brothers how tiresome it is to be subjected to ‘wit’ 
and not ‘humour’. The witty say things ‘that make one start, without 
making one feel’ and are overly concerned with fashion and etiquette. 
There is a superficiality in Keats’ description of these dining partners 
and he would much rather be in ‘low company’ where humorous 
conversation predominated, not fashion and clever verbal games. For 
Keats, an enjoyable meal is one where the company is unpretentious and 
less likely to be persuaded by the continuing ephemerality of fashion. 
The illustrations provided in Keats’ letter represent the interplay 
between an encounter with the external world, the painting or these 
companions, in conjunction with an internal/emotive response. It is 
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at this stage of the letter that Keats introduces negative capability, and 
at this stage of our chapter we return to psychoanalysis to make links 
between such negative capability, Klein’s theory of mental positions and 
fundamentalism.
Unlike Freud, Klein (1998) assumed that the ego and its defences 
were active in the infant from birth, and that mature mental development 
equated to a resolution of internal desires with external realities. Klein 
proposed two mental positions that corresponded to the developing 
relationship between the internal self and the external other: the early 
paranoid-schizoid, and a latter, more mature depressive position. The 
very young paranoid-schizoid infant has the experience of hunger, or 
the desire to be cuddled, but as yet no symbolic way of communicating 
this to an ‘other’. As a result, there is a conflict between the individual’s 
internal experience and the reality of an ‘other’-dominated external 
world. The infant also cannot distinguish between the self and other and 
inhabits a frustrating world, with feelings, without memory, which are 
unknown and seemingly unknowable. It is this paranoid-schizoid mode 
of functioning with which Keats’ negative capability struggles, staying 
with uncertainty, doubt and myth without access to fact or reason. What 
is significant is that the infant does not stay stuck in paranoid-schizoid 
thinking, and can be enabled, with the help of an empathic other, to 
move towards a depressive, more integrated position where needs can 
be satisfied, if always provisionally, and where the world is a mix of 
nurture and frustration.
The achievement of the human infant is the creative act of successfully 
negotiating the paranoid-schizoid position, in relationship, informed by 
the symbols and metaphors offered by language, to be able to inhabit the 
psychic reality of the depressive position. From the perspective of the 
depressive position the infant can utilize language, alongside feelings, 
to think about a world previously experienced through feelings alone, 
and importantly to distinguish between the needs of self and other. 
Therefore, the shift from paranoid-schizoid to depressive thinking is a 
move from selfish frustration, with the creative use of language, to a 
position where metaphor and abstract thinking can be used to integrate 
the needs of the self and others. Despite Klein locating her description of 
the paranoid-schizoid position in very early infant experience, it is largely 
assumed (see Bion, 1963) that this and the depressive position are two 
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mental states that exist across the lifespan; and can be thought about as 
normative as well as pathological (Britton, 1998, cited in Harrang, 2012). 
The thinking characteristic of both the paranoid-schizoid and depressive 
positions provides insight into unconscious processes that may help us 
theorize the nature of fundamentalism, as against an emotional and 
intellectual openness in the history of workers’ education.
As we have suggested, paranoid-schizoid thinking is a frustrating 
state, without memory, waiting for meaning to evolve, during which 
the infant or the adult experiences feelings that are as yet unarticulated. 
For the adult, negative capability — where unknowns are sensed and 
thought about with others in the right environment — needs time to 
emerge. Bion (1970, cited in Harrang, 2012) argues that this is the space 
in which creativity emerges, leading to the depressive position, and it is 
a normal part of thinking throughout the lifespan. Britton (1998, cited 
in Harrang, 2012) acknowledges that each of Klein’s positions can also 
be experienced pathologically: for example, if the frustrations inherent 
within paranoid-schizoid thinking, or the experience of negative 
capability, are not resolved, then the adult will exaggerate good and 
bad feelings. Unconscious defences operate to protect the self, resulting 
in primitive ‘splitting’, where good feelings are introjected, and bad 
feelings projected outwards onto external objects. Therefore, the self is 
experienced as good and the other as bad, and a fundamentalist, black 
and white/right and wrong splitting predominates. Interestingly, Britton 
also recognizes a potential pathology when the more thoughtful, mature 
depressive position is used to defend against uncertainty, as well as the 
anxiety of the paranoid-schizoid position. Again, the fundamentalist 
can be seen to inhabit such positions and to hold on, in an extreme and 
exaggerated manner, to the security of established belief system(s), or 
to grab at new ones, without properly internalizing and digesting their 
complex qualities and discursive potential. 
The fundamentalist is not therefore to be seen as simply ‘stuck’ 
in a primitive paranoid-schizoid position, unable to access and use 
negative capability; for it is equally possible that certainty in more 
mature depressive thinking provides sufficient motivation to defend 
against the potential uncertainty of negative capability. Keats’ letter 
contains both possibilities: the depressive certainty of the witty 
fashionable bore, and the painting that, despite being accurate, does 
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not evoke deep emotion. He also references Coleridge’s attempt to 
describe beauty ‘pursed through Volumes’ that ultimately ‘obliterates 
all consideration’ and it is in the lines before this that Keats introduces 
negative capability. It is here that Keats appreciates the creative 
accomplishments that can be achieved, if only artists or dinner 
companions could stay with uncertainty and allow thoughts to emerge 
in a world that is complex as well as psychically and psychosocially 
real, satisfying and frustrating.
Conclusion: Negative Capability
N otwithstanding, being colonized by the truth and nothing but a truth denotes the opposite of certainty or epistemological 
substance — it represents a fragile and uncertain subjectivity in need of 
externally derived authority, whether of Marxism, religion or whatever. 
But ‘liberal’ workers’ education provided a cultural and educational 
space to engage with fundamentalisms in various guises, including 
racism and bigotry, and to move towards what Melanie Klein (1998) 
called the depressive position. This involves some acceptance of the 
good and not so good in every one of us, and thus greater openness 
to the other and otherness (see Nancy Dobrin, 1990, for instance, for 
one compelling account). Here was a cultural space of sufficient 
equality, respectfulness (including towards the bigot), dialogue and 
truth-seeking. At best the process generated what critical theorist Axel 
Honneth (2007; 2009) calls self/other recognition, including the capacity 
to recognize the other by being fully recognized oneself. Through life 
writing and auto/biographical narrative research, we bear witness to 
how educators like Tawney and the worker-students created a good-
enough space to question and transcend discursive assumptions and 
engage in the eclectic symbolic world, and its otherness, in emotionally, 
intellectually and discursively liberating ways. 
How best to conclude our discussion of negative capability? Stephen 
Hebron (2009, 2017) writes of how, in December 1817, Keats’ letter to his 
brothers talked of returning from a Christmas pantomime and discussed 
various subjects: several thoughts dovetailed in his mind, Keats said, and 
he wondered about the qualities that went to form great and satisfying 
achievement especially in literature. Shakespeare possessed such 
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qualities in abundance, but less so with Coleridge, he thought. Keats 
concluded that negative capability was at the core of this quality: when 
a person can stay in uncertainties, or mysteries and doubts, without 
irritably reaching after fact, reason or certainty. His language, although 
not immediately clear, is suggestive and idiosyncratic. Obviously, the 
word ‘negative’ is not used pejoratively but to communicate a notion 
that a person’s potential is defined by what he or she does not possess. 
Essential to literary achievement, Keats insists, is a certain passivity, a 
willingness to wait and let what is mysterious or doubtful remain just 
that. It might in short be best to break off from a relentless search for 
knowledge, and instead contemplate something beautiful and true, in 
the Romantic spirit; ‘a fine verisimilitude’. The experience and intuitive 
appreciation of the beautiful, or of the potential beauty of a different 
idea or way of seeing, is central to poetic talent, but also to democratic 
educational sensibilities (Hebron, 2009; 2017). 
Moreover, such an idea finds deep traction in psychoanalytic thinking 
about struggles for profounder forms of change. Any new idea presents 
itself as an emotional experience, which can be beautiful but also 
threatening. Pleasure and pain — of losing cognitive certainty — may 
co-exist (Meltzer & Harris Williams, 1988). In the workers’ tutorial 
classes, as well as in other creative struggles in literature or in therapeutic 
settings, negative capability might just thrive, sufficiently, to enable a 
person to live in doubt, and then to experience, over time, a fundamental 
change in a way of seeing and feeling, despite how unsettling the process 
might be. The culture of learning groups matters in such a process: a 
spirit of fraternity, and the capacity of a teacher to live in uncertainty, 
matter greatly. Such cultures were at the heart of Tawney’s successful 
experiment in democratic education and may lie at the core of all good-
enough, inclusive and dialogical learning groups. 
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